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Constitutional War Powers in World
War I: Charles Evans Hughes and the
Power to Wage War Successfully

MATTHEW C. WAXMAN

On September 5, 1917, at the height
of American participation in the Great War,
Charles Evans Hughes famously argued that
“the power to wage war is the power to wage
war successfully.” This moment and those
words were a collision between the onset
of “total war,” Lochner-era jurisprudence,
and cautious Progressive-era administrative
development. This article tells the story
of Hughes’s statement—including what he
meant at the time and how he wrestled with
some difficult questions that flowed from
it. The article then concludes with some
reasons why the story remains important
today.1

Hughes and the Fighting Constitution
Hughes’s “war powers axiom”—that the
power to wage war is the power to wage
war successfully—has been widely cited and
quoted for the past century in court decisions
and briefs. It is often used in executive

branch opinions about war powers, including
recent ones concerning wars against terrorist
organizations. It frequently appears in legal
scholarship about war powers. But when
Hughes uttered those words that day, he was
not doing so as a Supreme Court Justice—or
in his other public roles, such as Secretary of
State. He was speaking as a private member
of the bar.
There is some irony that Hughes’s voice
would reverberate so influentially in war
powers jurisprudence, given that he never
ruled on a major war powers case as a judge.
He served first on the Supreme Court from
1910 until 1916, when he stepped down to
run for President as the Republican candidate against incumbent Democrat Woodrow
Wilson, whose supporters stressed that he
kept us out of the Great War. Hughes then
served again, this time as Chief Justice, from
1930 to 1941. Both of these happened to be
relatively peaceful, dry spells for significant
war powers cases, and in both instances,
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Hughes left the Court less than a year before
the United States declared war.
In September 1917, when Hughes gave
his most detailed analysis of constitutional
war powers, he did so in a private capacity,
not as a government official of any kind, in a
speech to the annual meeting of the American
Bar Association titled “War Powers Under the
Constitution.”2 Hughes defended expansive
government powers invoked by Wilson and
the Democrat-controlled Congress to wage
modern, industrial-age and industrial-scale
warfare.
By way of context, this was five months
after the United States declared war on
the side of the Allies against the Central
Powers—a war that had already been destroying Europe for three years.3 During those
months, the United States had built from near
scratch a massive army unlike any previous
American force. In doing so, the federal government had assumed unprecedented powers over American society. When President
Wilson had requested a war declaration from
Congress, he pledged not only to defend the
United States from immediate aggression but
also to prevent the recurrence of war and to
make the world safe for democracy. These
aims are especially important later in the
story.
It is hard to imagine today a speech
by any modern figure about major constitutional issues that would carry the weight of
Hughes’ words. The New York Times covered
his American Bar Association speech on
the front page, beneath the headline: “War
Power Ample, Hughes Declares: He Tells Bar
Association There Is Full Warrant for All that
We Are Doing.”4 Many other major newspapers across the country covered or even
distributed the remarks. For example, the
St. Louis Post-Dispatch reprinted the entire
speech in its Sunday editorial section later
that week.5 It did not hurt that, in the later
words of Justice Robert H. Jackson, Hughes
“look[ed] like God and talk[ed] like God.”
Indeed, Hughes carried personal authority

and credibility on constitutional issues to an
extent that would be hard for anyone—especially in a private capacity—to match today.
So what were the issues Hughes was
concerned with in this speech about “War
Powers Under the Constitution”? Today’s
biggest constitutional war powers controversies tend to focus on the President, especially
the question of whether the chief executive
has the power to launch a military action
or the scope of his exclusive powers over
how military operations are carried out. But
in 1917, there was no serious doubt that,
in those circumstances, only Congress could
take the nation formally into the Great War.
In any event, Wilson sought and received
Congress’s war declaration in April of that
year, as well as very broad delegations of
power for all the other actions he took. At that
time, the most contentious and consequential
war powers questions were less about the
President than about the scope of Congress’s
powers in wartime.
When Hughes proclaimed that “the
power to wage war is the power to wage
war successfully,” he was making a detailed
Article I argument about legislative power,
namely, that by virtue of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, Congress’s powers expanded
during war as necessary to provide the means
needed for victory. If required by wartime exigency, Article I powers were to be read more
expansively than during peacetime. Meanwhile, restrictions on those powers were to be
loosened. This included loosening the principle of nondelegation, the idea that Congress
could not transfer its policy-making function
to the President. Hughes also envisioned a
loosening of basic rights in wartime. Again,
this was the Lochner era, so the most significant rights at that time were economic rights,
such as freedom of contract.
Hughes described in his research notes
these flexible, elastic wartime features as part
of the “Genius of our institutions.”6 He by no
stretch invented the core idea that constitutional powers must match unpredictable and
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evolving security needs; he credits Alexander
Hamilton for laying the idea’s foundation in
The Federalist, for example, and especially
Federalist essay numbers 23 and 26. In those
essays, Hamilton wrote about the core power
of the government to protect the Union and
the dangers of imposing immovable limits
on its ability to do so. Hughes also credits
President Lincoln for putting these ideas into
action during the Civil War, a conflict that
also required new levels of national mobilization and that generated many legal precursors
to the specific powers Hughes discusses. But
Hughes both expanded on the theory and lent
special political and intellectual credibility to
this understanding at a time of simultaneous
upheaval in constitutional law and in military
technology and strategy.
Over the past century since Hughes
spoke, this basic view—that the Constitution
bends to meet wartime needs—has been
accepted by all three branches of government.
At the time, however, he was pushing against
two other powerful schools of thought in
American constitutional thinking.
One of those contrary schools viewed
war powers as “extra-constitutional”: The
Constitution did not have to accommodate wartime needs because its requirements
would naturally be suspended in wartime.
Hughes, by contrast, lodged all necessary war
powers firmly within the Constitution.
Another school viewed congressional
powers as fixed in both war and peace: The
Constitution already built in all the express
powers needed to wage war effectively, and
the dangers of interpreting implied powers
fluidly were too great to allow. Rejecting
this rigid view, Hughes saw war powers as
evolving, because warfare itself evolved. As
he said in concluding his 1917 War Powers
speech:
It has been said that the Constitution marches. That is, there are
constantly new applications of unchanged powers, and it is ascer-
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tained in novel and complex situations, the old grants contain, in
their general words and true significance, needed and adequate authority. So, also, we have a fighting
constitution….
In the end, Hughes’s view won out. In
World War I, our “fighting Constitution” was
marching at a very fast clip. No other single
document better shows it.

War Powers Controversies of 1917
So what, then, were the specific controversies that Hughes had in mind in September
1917? Why did he feel the need to offer such
a strong constitutional defense of the U.S.
government’s wartime actions?
In constitutional law discussions today,
World War I is mostly remembered for
free-speech restrictions. Most notably, after
Congress passed the Espionage Act of 1917
and the Sedition Act of 1918, the Wilson
Administration aggressively prosecuted hundreds of cases against publishers and dissenters for allegedly interfering with the war
effort. Hughes does not say a word in his
1917 war powers speech about the Espionage
Act, even though it had been passed several
months earlier after considerable debate. He
does not say anything about free expression at
all, in fact, on which there was little judicial
precedent at the time.
Instead, the two big issues that Hughes
addresses—the ones at which his “power
to wage war successfully” axiom aimed—
were (1) the national draft and (2) extensive economic regulation. These were radical
expansions of federal government authority
based on Congress’s war powers.
Note that these particular radical
expansions—a national draft and extensive
economic regulation—were actions taken on
the home front. Controversial war powers
were not about actions “over there”; they
were about actions over here. They were
domestic national powers deemed necessary
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to waging modern combat thousands of miles
away—necessary because twentieth-century
warfare looked nothing like the Framers
could have imagined. These are also policies
that are now constitutionally uncontroversial
even in peacetime, following the New Dealera expansion of Congress’s power over the
domestic economy and following early Cold
War experiences in maintaining permanently
high levels of military readiness.
As to the draft, when the United States
entered the war in April 1917—a war that
had been devouring European soldiers at
an unprecedented pace—the nation had only
a few hundred thousand troops, mostly on
the Mexican border. The political leadership
knew that only a national draft, and more
specifically a “selective service” system,
could efficiently and rapidly grow that force
by an order of magnitude while also keeping
workers in critical industries in their jobs on
the home front.
The draft was an emotional issue for
Hughes. In the six weeks leading up to
the speech, he had spent a lot of his time
as chairman of the New York City Draft
Appeals Board, reviewing petitions for draft
exemptions submitted by city draftees. By
the time Hughes spoke, the board was deciding hundreds of cases a day. Aware that
he was sending young men to risk their
lives overseas, Hughes insisted on personally
signing each appellant’s papers.7 The day
before his war powers speech, he stood
alongside former President Teddy Roosevelt
and others in front of the New York Public
Library to watch recently drafted soldiers
march up Fifth Avenue.8 Many of those on
parade likely had only weeks earlier received
rejection letters bearing Hughes’s signature to
their draft appeals.
Doctrinally, the constitutionality of a
draft might seem like a pretty easy question, given that Article I gives Congress an
unqualified power to “raise and support
armies,”9 but throughout American history to
that point there had been significant doubt

whether the federal government could conscript soldiers and additional doubt about
whether those conscripted soldiers could be
sent abroad. Hughes, therefore, devoted a lot
of his speech to this issue, and his notes
contained vast research on it.
The strongest constitutional objection to
a national draft was not, as one might guess,
one based on individual rights. It was a
structural argument about federalism. Involuntary conscription, ran the argument, was
an integral aspect of traditional state militia
powers protected by the Constitution’s Militia
Clauses. Those clauses give states the power
to keep and train well-regulated militias (historically made up heavily of local conscripts)
that could be called into service by Congress
for limited purposes. To allow the federal
government to conscript able-bodied men directly could, in effect, nullify these state prerogatives and protections. This constitutional
objection had carried powerful weight when
Secretary of War James Monroe unsuccessfully recommended a federal draft during the
War of 1812 and during the Civil War, when
the constitutionality of a federal draft was
hotly contested and never firmly resolved.10
Until World War I, a national draft was at
least constitutionally suspect, but for Hughes
its readily apparent military necessity—he
had watched the European armies rely on it
for several years—made its constitutionality
an easy matter: “There is no limitation upon
the authority of Congress to create an army
and it is for the president as Commanderin-Chief to direct the campaigns of that
army wherever he may think they should be
carried on.” For Hughes, the needs of modern
warfare had displaced early-American faith
in state militias as safeguards of republican
government.
As it happened, Hughes’s argument was
vindicated the next year by the Supreme
Court in a set of challenges grouped together
as the Selective Draft Law Cases.11 Drawing on the widespread international practice
of conscription, the Court, in a unanimous
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Charles Evans Hughes issued the phrase “The power to wage war is the power to wage war successfully” in an
address he delivered as a private citizen at an American Bar Association conference on September 5, 1917, in
Saratoga Springs, New York. He is pictured above walking with his daughter, Katherine.

opinion in those cases, held that the Militia
Clauses were not a limitation on Congress’s
power to institute a national draft—at least
not in the context of twentieth-century
warfare.
Moving from the question of the draft
to economic regulation, Hughes defended on
war powers grounds vast new federal authority, as well as congressional delegation of
that authority to the executive branch. In the
words of historian and political scientist Clinton Rossiter, the wartime economic power
granted by Congress was “infinitely more …
than had ever been given to an American
president. In absolute terms, it far exceeded
Lincoln’s, for it extended to a control of the

nation’s economic life that would have caused
a revolution in 1863.”12
In the months prior to Hughes’s war
powers speech, Congress had passed several
far-reaching laws committing to President
Wilson vast authority. Among the most famous was the Food and Fuel Control Act
(also known as the Lever Act), which gave
the President broad powers “to make such
regulations and to issue such orders as are
essential” to ensure adequate and equitable
supply and distribution of those critical
resources.13 This went against peacetime
limitations on congressional power. It went
against peacetime limits on congressional
delegation of policy discretion. And it went
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This photo shows Hughes (second from left) on the day before his war powers speech, standing alongside former
President Theodore Roosevelt (left), in front of the New York Public Library watching 7,000 recently drafted soldiers
march up Fifth Avenue. Many of those on parade likely had only weeks earlier received rejection letters to their
draft appeals bearing Hughes’s signature.

against peacetime understandings of Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights protecting
so-called “private” economic activities.
Hughes argued that those peacetime limitations on Congress’s powers must give way
to wartime needs. Congress, he argued, “is
confided the power to enact whatever legislation is necessary to prosecute the war with
vigor and success.” In these ways, Hughes’s
flexible and adaptive interpretation of the war
power addressed the major problem he saw
in September 1917, namely, how to mobilize
the entire national industrial economy for
modern, expeditionary war.
Again, in the end, the Supreme Court
validated Hughes’s views on wartime economic regulation and administration. Despite
plenty of challenges and opportunities for

judicial repudiation, no significant wartime
economic regulation was struck down as
beyond Congress’s powers, as an unconstitutional delegation, or as violating constitutional economic or contractual rights.
This was, as Hughes would say, the
Constitution marching in step with changes
in warfare.

The Problem of War Termination
In addressing one constitutional
problem, however, Hughes walked into
another one that echoes today. For him,
the elasticity of the power to wage war
successfully was justified on two confident
assumptions: that clear lines exist between
wartime and peacetime, and that following
successful war, there would be a reversion to
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constitutional normality. War-waging power
would be only temporary. But what if it were
not so temporary?
On November 11, 1918, the Allies and
Germany signed the Armistice that ended
the remaining fighting on the Western Front.
Often an armistice is only a pause, or a ceasefire pending further negotiations, but this was
a much more dramatic and decisive event.
Two days earlier, German Kaiser Wilhelm II
had abdicated. Under the Armistice terms,
Germany had to withdraw its troops and hand
over the bulk of its navy. President Wilson
declared that day to Congress, “The war thus
comes to an end, for, having accepted these
terms of armistice, it will be impossible for
the German command to renew it.”14
The ultimate mission was not yet accomplished in November 1918, however.
Although Germany had been subdued militarily at that point, President Wilson had
taken the country to war with a boldly
ambitious set of international security and
diplomatic aims. He said we were making the
world safe for democracy. Wilson viewed as
essential to American security the replacing of traditional European balance-of-power
politics with a new system of diplomatic
rules, ideals, and collective responses to
threats—and he had requested a war declaration from Congress on those terms. This
ambitious, global agenda greatly complicated
the task of determining when some baseline
level of security was achieved and, therefore,
when the expansive war powers of Congress
and the President were required to retract
back to peacetime form.
Put another way, if “the power to wage
war is the power to wage war successfully,”
should those war powers have come to an end
on November 11, 1918? Is the war successfully waged when the fighting stops on the
battlefield? Or when the goals are achieved?
Or something else? The U.S. government’s
position was that, although military victory
was achieved in November 1918, as a legal
matter war powers continued to operate.
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At this point, the story of Hughes and
war powers takes a major twist. For the next
couple of years, Hughes repeatedly spoke
out, wrote—and litigated—against the government for war powers overreach.
Hughes’s statements after the November
1918 Armistice show anxiety about constitutional adjustment, not the confidence of
his 1917 speech. In a Columbia University
lecture just weeks after the Armistice, he
remarked that the “astounding spectacle of
centralized control … has been the manifestation of the Republic in arms, fighting
as a unit, with powers essential to selfpreservation, which the Constitution not only
did not deny but itself conferred.”15 He
went on to warn, however, that wartime
conditions could be used pretextually to
advance political and legal agendas, and he
expected courts to play a checking role to
ensure that the return to peace brought also
a dismantling of the wartime administrative
apparatus. “What will it profit the Republic
if it gains the whole world and loses its
own soul?” he asked in a 1919 New York
Bar Association address.16 Once modern war
powers were turned on, Hughes worried that
the government would resist turning them
off.
In a fascinating 1919 case, Commercial
Cable Co. v. Burleson,17 Hughes unsuccessfully litigated this issue of when World War I
ended as a legal matter. The specific dispute
went as follows. Pursuant to a broad delegation of power over telecommunications systems, the federal government seized control
of the undersea cables operated by private
American companies. This would not have
been very legally controversial, especially
under Hughes’s theories of expansive and
flexible war powers, except for an important
wrinkle: The government’s seizure of the
cables did not occur until about a week
after the Armistice. Combat operations in
Europe had halted. Hughes, who was in
1919 litigating cases at an incredible pace,
regarded the seizures as “wholly unwarranted
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Hughes sketched out the rough outline of his argument by hand. His research notes for the speech are in his
personal papers at the Columbia University manuscript and rare book library.

and arbitrary,” and so he represented one of
the cable companies.18
A notable aspect of this case is that
it featured a dramatic courtroom debate in
the Southern District of New York between
Hughes and Judge Learned Hand—two of
the greatest legal minds of the time—over
how to measure the end of war. Was it based
on readily observable military conditions,
or did it depend on a political assessment
that war aims had been achieved? Thanks to
an extensive New York Times report of the
courtroom arguments, we have a good record
of their exchange across the bench.19
The main crux of Hughes’s argument
was that the cable seizure exceeded statutory
authority, which was tied to the existence of
an ongoing war and a threat to national security or defense, but there was also a constitutional dimension: He argued that in light of
present circumstances, the broad delegation
of power was illegitimate. Hughes argued
that the war was, in a practical sense, over,
and therefore the government’s expansive,
wartime regulatory authorities had expired.
Judge Hand pressed Hughes hard on this
point in court: “[T]he security or defense of

the nation depends, does it not, upon the
objects for which the war was fought, and
until those objects have been ascertained authoritatively by a peace, it cannot be said that
the security and defense is established….Is
that not so?”
Hughes responded:
I think that what may be achieved,
in the sense of the final results
of the war, will probably not be
determined during our lifetime. …
It was not a danger in the sense
of a nebulous regard for possible
policies, which could not be vindicated and carried through by force,
that Congress had in mind. It was
an actual state of applied force that
we were looking to in arming the
President with these extraordinary
powers….
Hughes pushed further in saying that this
was not just any armistice: He pointed out
that the President himself had told Congress
that the enemy had been reduced to a state
of helplessness. The President had stated that
the enemy could not have resumed the war.
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The president acknowledged that the war no
longer posed a direct security threat to the
people of the United States.
Judge Hand then turned Hughes’s axiom
back on him, essentially saying that if the
power to wage war is the power to wage war
successfully, then success should be gauged
not just by the absence of immediate danger
but by reference to the ultimate war aims—
and the President and Congress should determine what those aims are. “[S]urely all means
necessary to the achievement of that final end
are necessary to the security and defense of
the nation.”
Hughes lost that case—Judge Hand interpreted the President’s cable seizure power
as unreviewable,20 and Hughes’s appeal to
the Supreme Court was mooted when the
government relinquished control over the
cables—but Hughes continued to press this
war termination issue. In fact, in a 1920
speech, he ramped up his warnings, declaring
that “we may well wonder in view of the
precedents now established whether constitutional government as heretofore maintained
in this republic could survive another great
war even victoriously waged.”21 Around that
time, Hughes litigated other claims that the
security threat had sufficiently diminished
so that the government’s war power should
cease, too, but those cases were all resolved
on other grounds.
The story of Hughes and his war powers
axiom then takes another turn, however. Just
a few years later, Hughes curiously seems to
have backed off his earlier concerns, taking
him back around to his core 1917 position, as
his worries about war termination and indefinite war powers were apparently allayed. In a
series of 1927 Columbia University lectures,
Hughes, without at all addressing the endof-war issue, re-emphasized his arguments
that the power to wage war is the power to
wage war successfully.22 As Chief Justice,
in a 1934 opinion about a state mortgage
regulation during the Great Depression, he
doubled down on this war powers axiom by
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using it now to help justify general emergency powers.23
Part of the answer to why Hughes returned to this position is probably the result
of political process. Upon taking control of
the White House in 1921, President Warren
Harding had pledged the return to “normalcy.” Hughes would serve as Harding’s
Secretary of State, and Hughes negotiated the
formal peace treaty with Berlin soon after the
President signed Congress’s joint declaration
finally ending World War I in July 1921.
Another factor in Hughes’s apparent return to
comfort with vast war power probably has to
do with the judiciary. Also in the early 1920s,
the Supreme Court seemed to reserve at least
some minimal role for courts in policing
the durational boundaries of war powers.24
These precedents, especially when combined
with the political shifts just mentioned, would
likely have mitigated Hughes’s concerns that
war powers would be perpetuated indefinitely. Yet it remains somewhat of a mystery
how Hughes reconciled his expansive theory of wartime legislative powers with the
concern—so clearly illustrated in the cable
seizure case—that they could and would
be extended in time well beyond what he
thought was justified.

The Fighting Constitution a Century Later
Studying Hughes’s 1917 speech today,
a little more than a century later, one is
struck by both its timeless and its anachronistic features. The specific controversies—
the draft and economic regulation—are of
a bygone era, but the central claim that
our “fighting constitution” confers flexible
powers to “wage war successfully” still holds.
Today’s war powers controversies
are rarely about the extent and limit of
Congress’s powers, as they were in 1917.
They are mostly about the scope of the
President’s unilateral war powers. One reason
for this shift in emphasis is the growth
of presidential power, especially since the
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For Hughes, there was an assumption that following a successful war, there would be a reversion to constitutional
normality. But the power to wage war turned out to not be as temporary as he envisioned. Above, men of the U.S.
64th Regiment, 7th Infantry Division, celebrated the news of the Armistice on November 11, 1918.

early Cold War. But another reason, so
apparent in reflecting on Hughes’s speech,
is that Congress’s other powers—its nonwar
powers—have expanded so dramatically
since World War I. All of the domestic
economic regulations justified during World
War I as an exercise of constitutional war
powers could, by the end of World War
II, easily have been justified under a farbroadened reading of the commerce power—
even in peacetime. Doctrines and the exercise
of nonwar emergency legislative powers have
expanded, too. Since World War I, Congress
has enacted hundreds of emergency power
provisions that the President may activate by
proclaiming a national emergency, whether
or not the country is in a state of war.
Looking back, then, World War I was
probably the pivotal moment in American
history when the differential between the federal government’s war powers and its normal,
peacetime powers reached its apex. Once
warfare became “total” in the early twentieth

century, legislative war powers became the
basis for completely transforming a largely
laissez faire system into a centrally administered statist one and for subordinating a state
militia system to the federal government’s
army powers. War has continued to become
more complex, but legislative war powers
have not had to keep up in part because other
constitutional powers now provide such vast
authority. Reading Hughes’s speech today is
an important reminder that war no longer
opens much otherwise locked-up legislative
power.
I say “much,” because it does open
some powers. The wars against al-Qaeda
and the “Islamic State” terrorist organization
in recent decades have reopened the issue
of the substantive scope of legislative war
powers. In particular, they have raised questions (sometimes answered using citations to
Hughes’s 1917 axiom), such as the scope
of wartime constitutional powers to detain
enemy fighters or to try them in military
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commissions.25 On the one hand, these
claimed powers seem exceptional because the
war against sprawling transnational terrorist
groups lacks the organizational, geographic,
and temporal boundaries usually associated
with modern warfare, although this story is a
good reminder that struggling with temporal
boundaries of warfare is not a new problem.
On the other hand, powers such as detaining
enemy fighters or trying them in military
commissions are quite ordinary and limited.
The context in which the government seeks
to use these powers is extraordinary, but the
measures themselves are traditional to military conflict, much more akin to the wartime
powers that the constitutional framers envisioned than those Hughes defended during
World War I.
Finally, the ongoing war with transnational terrorist groups has made Hughes’s
post-Armistice concerns about enduring war
powers seem forewarning. One hears echoes
of Hughes’ cable-seizure-case arguments in
today’s arguments against indefinite wars
with terrorist groups. The challenge of indefinite war against terrorist organizations
is not simply one of attaining a successful military outcome. As with determining
whether World War I had been “wage[d]
successfully,” it is also a matter of defining
the terms of victory.
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